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Abstract
The paper studies procurement contracts with pre–project investigations under hidden
information and hidden action. The principal generally beneﬁts from inducing the agent
to conduct pre–project investigations to avoid cost overruns and false project cancelations.
Due to a rent eﬀect, hidden information leads to systematic distortions in information ac-
quisition: the agent acquires too much information to prevent cost overruns and too little
information to prevent false project cancelations. The optimal mechanism is a menu of
option contracts which exhibit a costly quitting option. They achieve the dual goal of
providing incentives for information acquisition and truthful information revelation.
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11 Introduction
Practitioners experienced in managing procurement projects stress the importance of pre–
project planning. Based on a number of case studies, Gibson and Hamilton (1994) conclude
that “there does exist a positive, quantiﬁable relationship between eﬀort expended during the
pre-project planning phase and the ultimate success of a project.”1 The goal of pre–project
investigations is to obtain more accurate cost estimates, which allow the procurer to decide
more carefully about whether to implement the project. Pre–project planning is, in other words,
a process of information acquisition before the ﬁnal implementation decision is taken.2 The
project management literature not only stresses the importance of eﬀective pre–project planning
but also warns procurers to keep as much control over this process as possible. For instance,
Gibson et al. (2006, p.41) write in their empirical appraisal that procurers frequently “decide to
delegate the pre-project planning process entirely to contractors, often with disastrous results”.
Given the importance of pre–project planning and these observed “disastrous results” from
delegation, we develop and analyze an economic model of pre–project planning to enhance our
understanding of the process and the associated problems.
Our starting point is the observation that the observed “disastrous results” from delegation
point to diverging objectives between the procurer and contractor and subsequent incentive
problems. Due to the contractor’s superior expertise, we can identify three sources of incentive
problems in pre–project investigations. First, the contractor is already in a better position to
estimate the project’s cost from the very outset. Hence, the procurer–contractor relationship
typically exhibits ex ante hidden information. Second, the contractor, as the expert, is often in
the better position to evaluate the additional information which the pre–project investigation
reveals. Hence, pre–project investigations lead to ex post or, more appropriately, interim hidden
information. Third, the amount of information that results from pre–investigations will largely
depend on the contractor’s own actions such as his advice and expertise on how to perform the
investigations. Hence, pre–project investigations often also involve a hidden action problem.
1See also, e.g., Turner (1993), Gibson et al. (2006), K¨ ahk¨ onen (1999) and Dahlin, Bjelm, and Svensson
(1999).
2Gibson et. al. (1995) deﬁne pre–project planning “as the process of developing suﬃcient strategic informa-
tion for owners to address risk and decide whether to commit resources to maximize the change for a successful
capital facility project”.
2To better understand these incentive problems, we study the optimal design of procurement
contracts with pre–project investigations. Intuitively, the procurer’s main concern is to protect
herself against the risk that the contractor abuses pre–project investigations to enhance his in-
formational advantage. In order to explore how these concerns aﬀect the pre–project planning
phase, we ﬁrst investigate the conditions under which costly pre–investigations should be con-
ducted and for which purpose. With these insights, we then study how the procurer optimally
structures her contracts to deal with the diverse incentive problems. Finally, we investigate
how the incentive problems distort pre–investigations and aﬀect their economic value.
From a more theoretical perspective, pre-project investigation is a process of information
acquisition that inﬂuences the information structure over time. As a consequence, the design
of optimal pre-project investigations is a problem of optimal dynamic mechanism design. Our
approach is, therefore, to extend the standard procurement models based on Baron and Myerson
(1982) and Laﬀont and Tirole (1986) and study the optimal design of procurement contracts
when the agent (contractor) can obtain additional private information about the project’s cost
before the project is executed. Our extension, moreover, incorporates the aforementioned three
sources of asymmetric information: an ex ante hidden information problem, an interim hidden
information problem, and a hidden action problem.
Our results are as follows. First, we derive the ﬁrst–best solution for the benchmark case
in which there are no incentive problems. We show that in the ﬁrst–best pre–investigations
are used to mitigate one of two implementation errors. If the initial information about the
project is favorable and indicates a positive social value, then the pre–investigation is used to
prevent cost overruns. In this case, the economic value of the pre–investigation is the expected
social value from canceling a high cost project that initially looked promising. For this case, we
say that information acquisition prevents false positives (or type I errors). In contrast, if the
initial cost information is unfavorable so that it leads to a cancelation of the project, then the
pre–investigation is used to correct a possibly false cancelation of the project. In this case, the
economic value of the pre–investigation is the expected social value from executing a project
that initially looked too costly to implement. For this case, we say that information acquisition
prevents false negatives (or type II errors).
Second, we derive the optimal contract when the ﬁrst–best cannot be implemented due to
3the presence of hidden information and hidden action. We show that the optimal contract
can be implemented by a menu of contracts that oﬀers a ﬁxed–price contract and a range of
option contracts. The ﬁxed–price contract obliges the contractor to carry out the project in
all cost circumstances for a “ﬁxed–price”. The option contract gives the contractor the right
to ﬁrst conduct a pre–investigation and then decide whether to complete the project for an
“exercise–price” or, alternatively, quit the project for a “quitting–price”. We show that the
optimal contract exhibits exercise–prices that are smaller than the ﬁxed–price and quitting–
prices that are actually penalties. This combination of contracts is the key instrument to solve
the incentive problems that arise in the pre–investigation process. Option contracts provide
information acquisition incentives for an agent with large cost uncertainties and, in addition, to
disclose the acquired information truthfully. At the same time, the combination of low exercise–
prices and quitting–penalties deters an agent whose value of information is relatively low to
cash in on the information acquisition compensation by simply exerting one of the options
without actually acquiring information.
Third, we investigate the distortions in information acquisition under the optimal second
best contract. We demonstrate that, in comparison to the ﬁrst best, the optimal contract in-
duces too much information acquisition to prevent false positives (type I errors) and too little
information acquisition to prevent false negatives (type II errors). These distortions in infor-
mation acquisition are exclusively driven by an information rent eﬀect which occurs, because,
in the second best, the principal takes into account the impact of information acquisition on
the agent’s information rent. Our key insight is that the direction in which the information rent
eﬀect distorts information acquisition depends on the error type that the additional informa-
tion is meant to prevent: If an agent acquires information to prevent false positives, then some
projects are canceled which would otherwise have been implemented. This necessarily reduces
the ex ante probability with which the project is implemented and, just as in the static model,
the principal, therefore, has to give up fewer information rents to achieve compatibility. Hence,
the information rent eﬀect provides the principal with excessive incentives to induce information
acquisition to prevent false positives. The same logic, yet with the opposite sign, applies when
information acquisition is used to prevent false negatives. In this case, information acquisition
raises the ex ante probability with which the project is implemented and thus requires higher
information rents to more eﬃcient types. Hence, with respect to false negative, the information
4rent eﬀect provides the principal with too little incentives to induce information acquisition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the relation to the
literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 discusses the ﬁrst–best benchmark. In
section 5, we present the principal’s problem which we solve in section 6 both with and without
contractible information acquisition. In section 7, we discuss the distortions implied by optimal
contracting. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the growing literature on optimal dynamic mechanism design. This
literature studies optimal contract design in environments in which information is privately
revealed to the agents over time and the contract conditions on sequential communication
of information by the agents.3 A recent paper by Pavan et al. (2008) provides a general
framework that encompasses earlier contributions on dynamic price discrimination (e.g., Baron
and Besanko (1984), Laﬀont and Tirole (1990, 1996), Battaglini (2005)), or on sequential
screening (e.g. Courty and Li (2000), Dai et al. (2006), Es¨ o and Szentes (2007a)). While this
literature takes the arrival of new information as exogenous, our contribution is to endogenize
the acquisition of new information by the agent.
Among the mentioned papers, our setup is most similar to the sequential screening model
by Courty and Li (2000) who study monopolistic price discrimination when, at the point of
purchase, consumers are uncertain about their subsequent true demand yet know that they will
obtain additional information before actual consumption.4 Similar to Courty and Li (2000), we
impose a ﬁrst order stochastic dominance ranking condition on the family of the conditional
cost distributions conditional on the initial signal.5 In Courty and Li (2000), this assumption is
suﬃcient for employing a “local” approach that mimics the solution strategy for static screening
problems. We demonstrate that this insight remains valid when information acquisition is
endogenous. The optimal contract derived by Courty and Li (2000) also displays a menu which
3A number of papers deals with the design of eﬃcient mechanisms in dynamic environments. See, e.g., Athey
and Segal (2007a, 2007b), Bergemann and V¨ alim¨ aki (2008).
4Es¨ o and Szentes (2007a) extends Courty and Li (2000) to a multi–agent setting.
5In contrast, Dai et al. (2006) study an environment with second order stochastic dominance ranking.
5contains contracts with quitting options. Thus, our result makes clear that option contracts
are a robust feature of optimal sequential screening contracts even if information acquisition is
endogenous. In fact, such options not only work to screen consumers, but serve the additional
purpose of inducing information acquisition.
Closely related is also the model by Es¨ o and Szentes (2007b), where the principal can acquire
costly, additional information which only the agent can interpret. The authors demonstrate
that the principal can fully extract the additional surplus created by the new information and,
therefore, the principal always wants to fully disclose the new information to the agent. In
contrast to Es¨ o and Szentes (2007b), in our model it is the agent who acquires additional
information. If information acquisition is not contractible, this gives rise to a moral hazard
problem which is absent from Es¨ o and Szentes (2007b).6 Moreover, the paper does not analyze
the distortions that optimal contracting imposes on information acquisition which is a key
contribution of our analysis.
Our work is also related to the literature on information acquisition in principal–agent
problems. The key diﬀerence is that this literature studies the incentives of an agent to acquire
private information before he accepts or rejects the contract. Therefore, there is only a single
screening stage. Within this literature, the paper closest in spirit is Lewis and Sappington
(1997), who also study information acquisition by an agent in a procurement setting. They
assume, however, that the principal always induces the agent to acquire information. Therefore,
they do not address one of our central questions, how the incentive problem distorts the amount
of information acquisition. Cremer et al. (1998b) ask how the optimal screening contract needs
to be adapted when an initially uninformed agent can acquire private information after the
contract has been oﬀered.7 They impose the exogenous contracting restriction that the agent
has the right to quit and take his outside option after having acquired information. In our model,
6Notice also that in principle the agent may be made worse oﬀ by the additional information so that he may
not want to obtain it even if costless. Indeed, in Kr¨ ahmer and Strausz (2008) we present a model in which the
additional information may actually hurt the agent, since it allows the principal to lower the agent’s information
rent. Therefore, even if information acquisition is contractible, the agent has to be compensated not only for the
direct information acquisition costs but also for the potential reduction in information rent. However, it turns
out that this eﬀect is not present in the present model. This implies that Es¨ o and Szentes’ (2007b) analysis
does not rely on the implicit assumption that the principal can impose the information on the agent.
7A recent paper by Szalay (2008) extends Cremer et al. (1998b) to more general information structures.
6instead, the terms at which the agent can quit ex post are fully contractible. In fact, unlike the
contract of Cremer et al. (1998b), our optimal contract involves bonding and the agent will
sometimes make losses ex post (relative to his outside option). Intuitively, bonding improves
the principal’s ability to prevent the agent from abusing information acquisition to enhance his
informational position. In contrast to the two previous papers, Kessler (1998) assumes that the
principal oﬀers the contract only after potential information acquisition by the agent. In this
case, the principal cannot use the contract to induce any information acquisition by the agent.
Therefore, the principal has even less control over the agent. While all these papers share with
us that information is socially valuable, the literature has also studied information acquisition
that has no social value but is undertaken for strategic purposes only (see Cremer and Khalil
(1992), Cremer et al. (1998a)).
3 Model
A principal seeks to procure one unit of a good from an agent. The principal’s valuation for
the good is v > 0. There are two periods. In period 1, contracting takes place, and in period
2, the agent produces the good. Before contracting, true costs are not known with certainty
but the agent privately observes a noisy signal about true costs. Let the noisy signal be given
by the random variable ˜ γ and let true costs be given by the random variable ˜ c. The agent
privately observes the realization γ of ˜ γ, and it is common knowledge that ˜ γ is distributed with
distribution function F and density f = F ′ on the support Γ = [0,¯ γ]. We assume that f is





is non–decreasing in γ.
True costs are equal to the signal plus a random shock ˜ s: ˜ c = ˜ γ + ˜ s. The cost shock has
support R and is assumed to have zero conditional mean so that ˜ γ is an unbiased estimate of
costs: E[˜ c | γ] = γ + E[˜ s | γ] = γ.8 The distribution of ˜ c conditional on γ is given by G(  | γ)
8The additive speciﬁcation is without loss of generality because the shock can always be deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between true and expected costs. The assumption that the support of the shock, and thus of true
costs, is R is for convenience only and standard in the literature.
7with the conditional density g(  | γ). We further assume that the family {G(  | γ)}γ is ranked in
terms of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. That is, G(  | γ) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates
G(  | γ′) whenever γ > γ′. A low γ therefore indicates a low actual cost c.
For technical reasons, we assume that h′ exists and is bounded, and that all partial deriva-
tives of G and g exist and are bounded.
A speciﬁc version of our model is the independent case, where the distribution of the shock
is independent of γ. Formally, this means that there is a distribution function ˆ G such that9
G(c | γ) = ˆ G(c − γ). (2)
This assumption is natural when the cost shock is independent of the agent’s average eﬃciency
characteristics such as expertise, experience, or internal organization. A speciﬁc example in the
context of public procurement is an infrastructure project and the uncertainty pertaining to soil
conditions or ground water levels. The independent case guarantees the ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance ranking of {G(  | γ)}γ.
After the contract has been signed and before production takes place, the agent can, at
a cost k > 0, perfectly observe s and therefore learn the actual cost c. While the value of
k is common knowledge, the principal cannot observe which information the agent receives.
Hence, from the principal’s perspective, there is hidden information at the contracting as well
as after the information acquisition stage. In the analysis we will consider both contractible
and non–contractible information acquisition. Under non–contractibility, there is, in addition
to the two informational problems, also a hidden action problem at the information acquisition
stage.
Concerning the contracting framework we assume that, at the contracting stage, the princi-
pal makes the agent a take–it or leave–it oﬀer. If the agent rejects, he gets a type–independent
outside option of zero.
9Let ˆ G(s) be the probability that ˜ s ≤ s which is independent of γ by assumption. Thus, G(c | γ) = ˆ G(c−γ).
84 First–best
As a benchmark, we ﬁrst consider a ﬁrst–best world, in which all information is publicly observ-
able and information acquisition is fully contractible. In a ﬁrst best world, the issue is when
to execute the public project and to determine for which cost estimates γ the agent should
acquire additional information. In particular, a ﬁrst–best solution speciﬁes for each agent type
γ a probability αFB(γ) with which the agent is required to acquire information. Moreover, it
speciﬁes a probability qFB(γ,c) with which an agent executes the project who has acquired
information and whose true costs turn out to be c. Finally, a ﬁrst–best contract determines a
probability ¯ qFB(γ) with which an agent who has not acquired information executes the project.
Due to the absence of any strategic concerns, the production probabilities in the ﬁrst best







1 if v ≥ c






1 if v ≥ γ
0 if v < γ
. (3)
With these eﬃcient implementation decisions, we can determine the ﬁrst–best information
acquisition levels and understand how, in a ﬁrst best world, information is used.
Depending on the implementation decision in the absence of additional information, the
acquisition of information plays one of two roles. First, if the decision without information
acquisition is to implement the project, then the procurer commits a type I error if the costs
c turn out to be larger than v. In this case, a loss v − c is realized. Information acquisition







(c − v) dG(c | γ). (4)
Second, if the decision without information acquisition is to cancel the project, then the
procurer makes a type II error if the costs c turn out to be smaller than v. Information
acquisition prevents this error, and thus the (gross) expected value of information acquisition






(v − c) dG(c | γ). (5)
According to the ﬁrst–best implementation decision (3), the procurer optimally implements
the project without additional information exactly when γ ≤ v. Hence, the ﬁrst–best value of







I (γ) if γ ∈ [0,v]
JFB
II (γ) if γ ∈ (v, ¯ γ].
(6)
Because γ is an unbiased estimate of actual costs, JFB is continuous at γ = v.10 Moreover, the
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(  | γ)}γ implies that JFB is increasing in the
range γ ∈ [0,v] and decreasing in the range γ ∈ (v, ¯ γ]. Hence, JFB is single peaked with its
maximum at γ = v. Let kFB ≡ JFB(v) denote this maximum. Figure 1 illustrates the typical
shape of the curve JFB.
Information acquisition is eﬃcient for all γ with JFB(γ) ≥ k. Because JFB attains a
maximum at γ = v, information acquisition is never eﬃcient if k ≥ kFB. Whenever k < kFB,
single–peakedness of JFB implies that there exist exactly two cut–oﬀs γFB











2 ) = k. (7)
Thus information acquisition is eﬃcient if γ ∈ [γFB
1 ,γFB
2 ]. The next proposition summarizes
these results.
Proposition 1 The ﬁrst–best implementation probabilities are given by (3). Moreover, it holds:






1 if γ ∈ [γFB
1 ,γFB
2 ]















info acq. to prevent
type I errors
info acq. to prevent
type II errors
no info acq. no info acq.
Figure 1: First–best information acquisition
Figure 1 illustrates eﬃcient information acquisition by the agent. Without additional in-
formation, the principal executes the project whenever expected costs are below the project’s
value: γ ≤ v. Information has the highest value if expected costs are close to v. Thus, unless
prohibitively expensive, information acquisition occurs when expected costs are in the interval
[γFB
1 ,γFB
2 ] which is located around v. The Figure also illustrates the two diﬀerent ways in
which information acquisition is used. For average costs γ ∈ [γFB
1 ,v], information acquisition
prevents a type I error, and for average costs γ ∈ [v,γFB
2 ], information acquisition prevents a
type II error.
5 The principal’s problem
We now return to the original problem with asymmetric information and look for the contract
that maximizes the principal’s payoﬀ. Intuitively, a contract speciﬁes a transfer and the prob-
ability with which the agent has to produce the good in period 2. However, if information is
private and information acquisition is not contractible, a contract also has to induce the agent
to acquire information and communicate his information to the principal. In principle, the
number of ways in which the contract can structure the agent’s incentives is limitless.
A crucial step to reduce the number of possible contracts is to apply the revelation principle
for multistage games (Myerson 1986), which asserts that the optimal contract can be found in
10Note:
  ∞
v (c − v)dG(c | γ) =
  v
−∞(v − c)dG(c | γ) ⇔ γ − v = 0.
11the class of direct, incentive compatible mechanisms. A direct mechanism has the following
structure: First, it requires the agent to submit a report ˆ γ ∈ Γ in period 1. Subsequently,
the mechanism gives a, possibly probabilistic, recommendation to the agent whether or not to
acquire information. Finally, if the principal recommends the agent to acquire information, the
agent is required to submit a second report ˆ c ∈ R in period 2.11
Formally, we denote by α(ˆ γ) the probability with which the contract recommends informa-
tion acquisition if the agent’s report is ˆ γ. Let ¯ t(ˆ γ) and ¯ q(ˆ γ) be the transfer from the principal
to the agent and the probability of production if the agent submits a ﬁrst period report ˆ γ
and does not receive a recommendation to acquire information. Finally, let t(ˆ γ,ˆ c) and q(ˆ γ,ˆ c)
denote the transfer from the principal to the agent and the probability of production if the
agent submits a ﬁrst period report ˆ γ, receives the recommendation to acquire information and
submits a second period report ˆ c. Thus, a direct contract is a combination (α,¯ t, ¯ q,t,q).
A direct contract is incentive compatible under three conditions. First, it must give the
agent an incentive to report his ﬁrst period type truthfully. Second, it must give the agent
an incentive to follow the contract’s recommendation whether or not to acquire information.
Third, it must give the agent an incentive to report his second period information truthfully
whenever he has acquired information and reported his ﬁrst information honestly.
Formally, let ΓI = {γ ∈ Γ | α(γ) > 0} denote the set of agent types that acquire information
with a strictly positive probability. Then the incentive compatibility constraints for period 2
require for all γ ∈ ΓI that
t(γ,c) − cq(γ,c) ≥ t(γ,ˆ c) − cq(γ,ˆ c) ∀c,ˆ c ∈ R. (9)
To state the ﬁrst period incentive constraints, let U(γ) denote the utility of agent type γ if
he reports truthfully and adheres to the contract’s recommendation:
U(γ) ≡ α(γ)
   ∞
−∞
t(γ,c) − cq(γ,c) dG(c | γ) − k
 
+ (1 − α(γ))[¯ t(γ) − γ¯ q(γ)]. (10)
11Strictly speaking, the revelation principle requires the agent to report only his new information s. Because,
for a given γ, there is a one–to–one relationship between s and c, reporting s is strategically equivalent to
reporting c. As it turns out, notation is more convenient if we work with reports about c rather than s. See
also Es¨ o and Szentes (2007b) for how to quantify the amount “new information” when signals are correlated.
12Incentive compatibility means that the agent cannot attain a higher utility than U(γ) by
adopting a dishonest reporting and/or disobedient information acquisition strategy. Notice
that whatever the agent does in period 1, if he is required to submit a report in period 2, the
second period constraints (9) guarantee that he reports truthfully in period 2. In particular, if
a type γ does not acquire information, the second period incentive constraints (9) imply that,
whenever he has to report a cost ˆ c, he reports his expected costs γ.12 Likewise, if type γ reports
falsely some other type ˆ γ  = γ in period 1 and, after information acquisition, learns his actual
costs c, then the constraints (9) imply that he reports c honestly despite any earlier lies. Hence,
even though the revelation principle does not require it, our setup yields truthful revelation
also oﬀ–the–equilibrium path.13 With this in mind, we now consider all the deviations which
incentive compatibility is meant to prevent and classify them in three diﬀerent groups.
First, an agent type γ must not gain by reporting some type ˆ γ and, subsequently, adhering
to the contract’s information acquisition recommendation:
U(γ) ≥ α(ˆ γ)
   ∞
−∞
t(ˆ γ,c) − cq(ˆ γ,c) dG(c | γ) − k
 
+ (1 − α(ˆ γ))[¯ t(ˆ γ) − γ¯ q(ˆ γ)] ∀γ, ˆ γ ∈ Γ.(11)
Moreover, an agent type γ must not gain by reporting ˆ γ and then disobeying when the contract
requires him to acquire information:
U(γ) ≥ α(ˆ γ)[t(ˆ γ,γ) − γq(ˆ γ,γ)] + (1 − α(ˆ γ))[¯ t(ˆ γ) − γ¯ q(ˆ γ)] ∀γ, ˆ γ ∈ Γ. (12)
Finally, an agent type must not gain by disobeying when the contract requires him not to
acquire information. However, this cannot be optimal for any agent type, because when the
contract prescribes not to acquire information, transfers and implementation probabilities do
not condition on the additional cost information c but only on average costs γ so that the value
of information for the agent is zero. Thus, the agent would only lose information acquisition
costs.
If information acquisition was contractible, there would be only a hidden information prob-
lem and the only relevant constraints would be (11), while the constraints (12) would be re-
dundant. In this sense, (11) are pure adverse selection constraints. The constraints (12) only
12Expected utility of a type γ, who is ignorant of his actual costs c and reports some costs ˆ c, is t(γ,ˆ c) −
q(γ,ˆ c)
 
cdG(c|γ) = t(γ,ˆ c) − q(γ,ˆ c)γ. According to (9) his payoﬀ is maximized for a report ˆ c = γ.
13This would be diﬀerent if the support of ﬁnal costs c depended on the ﬁrst period information γ. See
Kr¨ ahmer and Strausz (2008) for a discussion of the case when the supports of ﬁnal costs do not overlap.
13arise when information acquisition is not contractible. They require truthtelling and action
obedience by the agent and, therefore, involve both adverse selection and moral hazard. In this
sense, (12) are mixed constraints.
To guarantee the agent’s participation in an incentive compatible contract, it needs to be
individually rational:
U(γ) ≥ 0 ∀γ ∈ Γ. (13)
Note that we require individual rationality from an ex ante perspective only. This means that
the agent cannot quit after having observed additional information.14 He might thus make
losses ex post. This is the appropriate assumption when long term commitment is possible and
“quitting” is publicly veriﬁable. We call an incentive compatible contract that is individual
rational feasible.
The principal’s payoﬀ from a feasible contract is the diﬀerence between the total surplus
and the agent’s utility. That is, when the agent is of type γ, the principal’s payoﬀ is
W(γ) ≡ α(γ)
   ∞
−∞
[v − c]q(γ,c) dG(c | γ) − k
 
+ (1 − α(γ))[v − γ]¯ q(γ) − U(γ), (14)
and the principal’s objective is his expected payoﬀ
W ≡
  ¯ γ
0
W(γ) dF(γ). (15)
The principal’s problem, referred to as P, can therefore be stated as follows:
P : max
(α,¯ t,¯ q,t,q)
W s.t. (9),(11),(12),(13). (16)
6 Solution to the principal’s problem
We solve the principal’s problem P in several steps. We ﬁrst consider a relaxed problem, where
we ignore the mixed constraints (12). As said earlier, this corresponds to the case in which
information acquisition is contractible.
14This contrasts the assumption in, for example, Cremer and Khalil (1998b) and formalizes the intuitive idea
in the introduction that the procurer should retain as much control as possible in order to prevent the agent
from abusing pre–project planning to enhance his informational advantage.
146.1 Contractible information acquisition
We refer to the relaxed problem with contractible information acquisition as R:
R : max
(α,¯ t,¯ q,t,q)
W s.t. (9),(11),(13). (17)
Our procedure to solve problem R is similar to the well–known approach to solve static screening
problems without additional ex post information.15 In static problems, when the agent’s cost
function satisﬁes the single–crossing property, then incentive compatibility is equivalent to a
monotone allocation rule and the fact that, up to the utility of the least eﬃcient agent, the
agent’s utility is determined by the allocation alone (revenue equivalence). The latter property
implies that the principal’s objective does not depend on transfers. In the present context,
the ﬁrst period incentive compatibility conditions (11) cannot be characterized in terms of
monotonicity conditions of the allocation rule. The reason is that the agent’s utility is given by
an expectation over his cost function and so depends on the whole schedule of allocations instead
of a single, type speciﬁc allocation only. This leaves the single–crossing property without bite.
However, (11) still implies that the agent’s utility is determined by the allocation alone. We
begin by establishing this property.
Observe that the agent’s overall utility consists of his utility when he is informed and his
utility when he is uninformed. Let uI(γ,c) ≡ t(γ,c) − cq(γ,c) − k denote the agent’s utility





I(γ,c) dG(c | γ) + (1 − α(γ))[¯ t(γ) − γ¯ q(γ)]. (18)
The following lemma demonstrates that, as a consequence of the period 2 incentive compatibility
constraints, an informed agent’s utility uI is determined by the allocation q(γ,c).
Lemma 1 Let γ ∈ ΓI. Then there are transfers t(γ,c) such that (9) holds if and only if
q(γ,c) is non–increasing in c; (19)
∂u
I(γ,c)/∂c = −q(γ,c). (20)
The proof of Lemma 1 is standard and therefore omitted. We proceed by deriving a necessary
condition that follows from the ﬁrst period incentive constraint (11) together with (20).
15This approach is also adopted in Courty and Li (2000).







q(γ,c) dc − (1 − α(γ))¯ q(γ). (21)
Lemma 2 follows by a standard envelope argument. Since U(γ) = −
  ¯ γ
γ U′(z)dz + U(¯ γ), the
agent’s utility is thus determined up to the least eﬃcient agent’s utility U(¯ γ). This leaves us
to determine U(¯ γ).
In a standard static problem, the utility of the least eﬃcient type is pinned down by the
individual rationality constraint, because the single–crossing property on the cost function
implies that the agent’s utility is monotone in type. Again, since in the present context the
agent’s utility is given by an expectation over a whole range of allocations, the single–crossing
property has no bite and cannot be used to determine U(¯ γ). Instead, we exploit that {G(  | γ)}γ
is ranked in terms of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. It implies that ∂G(c | γ)/∂γ ≤ 0, and
so by Lemma 2, U′(γ) ≤ 0. We therefore obtain the following result.
Lemma 3 Under (11) and (20), the individual rationality constraint (13) is equivalent to
U(¯ γ) ≥ 0.
Clearly, at the optimal contract it must hold that U(¯ γ) = 0. Setting U(¯ γ) = 0 takes care
of the individual rationality constraint and fully determines agent type γ’s utility by Lemma
2. Hence, we can insert U(γ) in the objective W. By applying a common integration by parts
argument, we obtain the objective as a function of the implementation and the information
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q(γ,c) dG(c | γ) − k
 
(22)




It is important to note how the constraints in R′ have changed relative to problem R. Observe
that they do not include the individual rationality constraint (13), because it has been used
to substitute out the expression U(¯ γ) in the principal’s objective. Similarly, by Lemma 1, the
16The details of the derivation are presented in the Appendix.
16period 2 incentive constraints (9) are equivalent to the constraints (19) and (20). Since we have
inserted the constraint (20) in the objective, we are left with the monotonicity constraint (19).
Notice however that an analogous argument to eliminate the period 1 incentive constraint
(11) does not work because, unlike Lemma 1, Lemma 2 states only a necessary but not a
suﬃcient condition for (11). Thus, even though we have inserted into the objective the utility
expression (21) derived from (11), we have not eliminated the constraint (11). It is precisely at
this point where the analogy to the standard static problem breaks down.
In the static problem, incentive compatibility is equivalent to monotonicity plus revenue
equivalence so that one is only left with a monotonicity constraint after revenue equivalence
has been used to substitute out the agent’s utility in the principal’s objective. The problem
is then solved by considering the unconstrained problem which can be solved by point-wise
maximization. Under a regularity condition on the hazard rate similar to (1), the solution to
the unconstrained problem automatically satisﬁes monotonicity.
Similarly to the static problem, we will now ignore the constraints (11) and (19) and de-
rive the solution to the unconstrained problem. This solution will automatically satisfy the
monotonicity condition (19) due to the monotone hazard rate condition (1). In contrast to the
standard problem however, we still have to show that transfers exist such that the solution to
the unconstrained problem satisﬁes (11).
Before we state the solution to the unconstrained problem, it is helpful to interpret the
objective (22) in terms of virtual costs that is familiar from the static framework. We can think
of the principal as maximizing total surplus where, instead of true costs, he faces higher virtual
costs that arise because an information rent has to be conceded to the agent. If information
acquisition does not take place, the virtual costs are γ + h(γ). They are the same as the
virtual costs in the static screening problem in which agent types cannot acquire additional
information. As usual, the hazard rate h(γ) measures the extent of asymmetric information
between the agent and the principal about the expected costs γ. If information acquisition
does take place, the virtual costs are c −
∂G(c|γ)/∂γ
g(c|γ) h(γ). They are the same as the virtual
costs in a sequential screening problem of the sort considered in Courty and Li (2000) in which
each agent type exogenously observes the cost shock. The term
∂G(c|γ)/∂γ
g(c|γ) is an informativeness
17measure17 which captures how the agent’s private knowledge about the true cost distribution
G changes across types. Thus, the modiﬁed hazard rate −
∂G(c|γ)/∂γ
g(c|γ) h(γ) measures the extent
of asymmetric information between the agent and the principal about true costs c. From now





As is usual in the sequential screening literature, we impose the regularity assumption that ψ
is non–increasing in both arguments and that for all γ ∈ Γ:18
  ∞
−∞
ψ(γ,c) dG(c | γ) = −1. (25)
In the independent case where the signal and the cost shock are independent, (2) implies
ψ(γ,c) = −1. (26)
This means that the possibility that the agent receives additional information in period 2 does
not change the degree of asymmetric information in period 1.
We now turn to the solution to the unconstrained version of problem R′. The solution can
be obtained by point–wise maximization for each γ in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the optimal
implementation probabilities are determined for ﬁxed α(γ). This step is well–known from the
static screening literature and amounts to setting the allocation q( ) to zero if the associated
term in the squared brackets in (22) is strictly negative and setting it to one otherwise. This
procedure yields:
Lemma 4 For each γ there is a unique c0(γ) ≤ v and there is a unique γ0 ≤ v given by
v = c0(γ) − ψ(γ,c0(γ))h(γ), v = γ0 + h(γ0), (27)
such that the optimal implementation probabilities in the solution to the unconstrained version






1 if c ≤ c0(γ)






1 if γ ≤ γ0
0 if γ > γ0
. (28)
17This term was introduced by Baron and Besanko (1984).
18A suﬃcient condition for (25) is that G(c|γ) converges fast enough to 1 as c → +∞ and fast enough to 0 as
c → −∞. It then follows by integration by part:
  ∞
−∞ ψ(γ,c) dG(c|γ) = ∂
∂γ
  ∞






−∞ c dG(c | γ) = −1. This suﬃcient conditions is routinely used in the literature (see e.g. Mas Colell et al.
(1995, p. 195.))
18Lemma 4 reveals the typical distortions that are implied by the rent–eﬃciency trade–oﬀ that
the principal faces. The principal distorts the implementation probabilities downwards relative
to the ﬁrst–best. When no information is acquired, the project is implemented only when
expected costs γ are smaller than γ0 ≤ v, while it is eﬃcient to implement the project when
γ ≤ v. When information is acquired, the project is implemented only when true costs c are
smaller than c0(γ) ≤ v, while it is eﬃcient to implement the project when c ≤ v. The downward
distortion lowers the information rent the principal needs to concede to the agent, because it
reduces the extent to which a relatively eﬃcient type can cash in on his cost advantage by
mimicking a relatively ineﬃcient type.
The second step is to determine the optimal information acquisition probabilities. Similarly
to the ﬁrst best, whether the optimal contract induces an agent type γ to acquire information
depends on the implementation decision in the absence of information acquisition. Just as in the
ﬁrst–best, the purpose of information acquisition is to prevent type I or type II implementation
errors. Indeed, suppose that the principal implements the project in the absence of further
information. In this case her payoﬀ is v − γ − h(γ). If information is available, the project
is implemented if costs are smaller than c0(γ) in which case the principal obtains the payoﬀ







v − c + ψ(γ,c)h(γ) dG(c | γ) − [v − γ − h(γ)]. (29)
Since
  ∞
−∞ ψ(γ,c)dG(c|γ) = −1, we can write v − γ − h(γ) =
  ∞







(c − ψ(γ,c)h(γ) − v)dG(c | γ). (30)
Expression (30) reveals that, due to information rents, the principal’s value of information is
distorted relative to the ﬁrst–best. From the principal’s perspective, a type I error occurs if
virtual costs, c − ψ(γ,c)h(γ), are larger than v. This is diﬀerent from a ﬁrst best perspective,
where a type I error occurs if true costs, c, are larger than v. In other words, an implementation
error of type I occurs from the principal’s perspective if true costs c are higher than the critical
cost level c0(γ) above which the principal would cancel the project. By canceling the project,
the principal prevents a loss and, eﬀectively, gains c − ψ(γ,c)h(γ) − v > 0.
19Note that the deﬁnition (27) implies that c0 is non–increasing in γ because ψh is non–
increasing in γ and c. Moreover, h is non–decreasing so that the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
ranking of {G(  | γ)}γ implies that J∗
I(γ) is increasing.
Similarly, suppose that, in the absence of information acquisition, the principal cancels the
project. In this case, information acquisition prevents a type II error whenever the value of the
project v exceeds the virtual costs c−ψ(γ,c)h(γ). The principal’s value of information (net of






(v − c + ψ(γ,c)h(γ))dG(c | γ). (31)
Because h is non–decreasing and c0 is non–increasing, the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
ranking of {G(  | γ)}γ implies that J∗
II(γ) is decreasing.
According to Lemma 4, the principal executes the project without additional information
exactly when γ ≤ γ0. Hence, the principal uses information acquisition to prevent type I errors








I(γ) if γ ∈ [0,γ0]
J∗
II(γ) if γ ∈ (γ0, ¯ γ].
(32)
Notice that J∗ is continuous in γ = γ0.19 Moreover, since J∗
I is increasing and J∗
II decreasing,






(v − c + ψ(γ0,c)h(γ0))dG(c | γ0).
Information acquisition by an agent type γ is optimal for the principal exactly when J∗(γ) ≥
k. Since J∗ is at most k∗, information acquisition is never optimal if k ≥ k∗. If k < k∗, then
single–peakedness of J∗ implies that there are exactly two cut–oﬀs γ∗





1) = k, J
∗(γ
∗
2) = k. (33)
Thus, it is optimal to induce information acquisition if γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2]. The following lemma
summarizes these results.




20Lemma 5 The optimal information acquisition probabilities in the solution to the uncon-
strained version of problem R′ are given as follows:






1 if γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2]




(ii) If k ≥ k∗, then α∗(γ) = 0 for all γ.
The next proposition establishes the existence of transfers which, jointly with the solution
to the unconstrained problem, satisfy the constraints (11) and (19). They therefore represent
a solution to the constrained problem R′.
Proposition 2 There are transfers (¯ t∗,t∗) such that the contract C∗ = (α∗,¯ t∗, ¯ q∗,t∗,q∗) solves
problem R′ and is, therefore, optimal.
Since the modiﬁed hazard rate −ψh is non–decreasing in γ, it is evident from inspection
that the implementation probabilities q∗ satisfy the monotonicity constraint (19). The less
obvious part of Proposition 2 is the construction of transfers so that the ﬁrst period adverse
selection constraints (11) are satisﬁed. Recall that for given implementation and information
acquisition probabilities, the agent’s utility must necessarily be of the form stated in Lemma
1 and Lemma 2, because otherwise incentive compatibility could not be met. This, in turn,
determines transfers through the deﬁnition of U and uI. It then remains to be shown that
the transfers thus deﬁned imply (11). But this is a consequence of the ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance ranking of {G(  | γ)}γ which therefore plays a role analogous to the single–crossing
property in the static context.
In the remainder of this section, we describe how the optimal direct mechanism C∗ can
be implemented indirectly by a menu of contracts that gives the agent a choice between a
ﬁxed price contract and variety of option–price contracts. This contract will only prescribe the
probability of information acquisition α and the transfers t conditional on the agent’s decision
whether to execute the project. We focus on the non–trivial case k ≤ k∗ in which some agent
types are required to acquire information under C∗.
21Under C∗, whenever the agent announces a type ˆ γ > γ∗
2, he is required to refrain from
information acquisition and project implementation. Because in this case the transfer is zero,
announcing a type ˆ γ > γ∗
2 is equivalent to rejecting the contract.
If the agent announces a type ˆ γ < γ∗
1, then the contract C∗ requires him not to acquire
information and implement the project with probability 1. Since α∗ and ¯ q∗ are constant for
all ˆ γ < γ∗
1, incentive compatibility implies that the transfer ¯ t∗(ˆ γ) also has to be constant for
all ˆ γ < γ∗
1. We refer to this ﬁxed transfer as ¯ t∗. Therefore, announcing a type ˆ γ < γ∗
1 is
equivalent to a “ﬁxed–price” contract which obliges the agent to complete the project at all
cost circumstances for the price ¯ t∗.
Finally, if the agent announces a type ˆ γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2], the contract requires him to acquire
information and to implement the project if and only if he announces in period 2 a cost value
ˆ c ≤ c0(ˆ γ). Because q∗(ˆ γ, ) equals one and is, therefore, constant for ˆ c ≤ c0(ˆ γ), incentive com-
patibility implies that the transfers t(ˆ γ,ˆ c) for ˆ c ≤ c0(ˆ γ) must also be constant. We denote this
transfer by t∗
1(ˆ γ). Similarly, because q∗(ˆ γ, ) equals zero for ˆ c > c0(ˆ γ), incentive compatibility
implies that the transfers t(ˆ γ,ˆ c) for ˆ c > c0(ˆ γ) must also be constant. We denote this transfer
by t∗
0(ˆ γ). Hence, it follows that we can describe the transfer schedule t∗(ˆ γ, ) by the two trans-
fers t∗
1(ˆ γ) and t∗
0(ˆ γ). This observation allows the interpretation of an “option” contract: After
announcing a type ˆ γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2] and acquiring information, the agent has the option in period 2
to carry out the project for the “exercise–price” t∗
1(ˆ γ) or to quit for the “quitting–price” t∗
0(ˆ γ).
It follows that the outcome induced by the direct mechanism C∗ can also be induced by the




2]}. The menu consists, ﬁrst, of the
ﬁxed–price contract (α∗ = 0,¯ t∗) which requires the agent not to acquire information and execute
the project at transfer ¯ t∗ and, second, of a range of option contracts (α∗ = 1,t∗
1(γ),t∗
0(γ))γ which
require the agent to acquire information and give him to option to complete the project for a
transfer t∗
1(γ) or quit the project for a transfer t∗
0(γ). Note that the transfers in contract C′
do not depend on the agent’s announcement of cost c, but instead condition transfers only on
whether he executes the project. As a result, the contract C′ is an indirect rather than a direct
mechanism. We summarize the alternative characterization of the optimal contract in the next
proposition.
22Proposition 3 If k ≤ k∗, then the outcome under the optimal contract C∗ also obtains with




2]} which oﬀers a choice between a
ﬁxed–price contract and a range of option contracts.
The proposition shows that, when the cost of information acquisition is small enough,
k < k∗, the optimal contract requires the agent to acquire information. Hence, the threat that
the agent abuses pre–project planning to enhance his informational position does not cause
information acquisition to break down. This conﬁrms theoretically the empirical observation
of Gibson and Hamilton (1994) that pre–project planning has a positive eﬀect. Moreover,
the proposition points to the degree of control that suﬃces to achieve this: the contract can
explicitly condition on whether the agent acquires information and executes the project. In
the next subsection, we investigate the more realistic case that the agent’s eﬀort to acquire
information is unobservable. This introduces a hidden action problem and makes information
acquisition non–contractible and implies less contractual control by the principal.
6.2 Non–contractible information acquisition
When information acquisition is not contractible, the optimal contract must also satisfy the
mixed constraints (12). We ﬁrst derive a condition under which these constraints do not
impose additional restrictions on the principal’s problem. We then show that under (26) this
condition is automatically satisﬁed. That is, when the signal ˜ γ is independent of the cost shock
˜ s, the optimal contract with contractible information acquisition can be implemented even if
information acquisition is not contractible.
Of course, if information acquisition costs are suﬃciently large such that the optimal con-
tract C∗ does not prescribe any information acquisition, then it does not matter whether
information acquisition is contractible or not, and C∗ is optimal in either case. So consider the
more interesting case, k ≤ k∗, where k is small enough for C∗ to prescribe some agent types
to acquire information. In this case, C∗ can be implemented through the contract C′ from
Proposition 3.
We show that there are two straightforward necessary conditions for C′ to satisfy the con-
straints (12). The ﬁrst necessary condition is that t∗
0(γ) ≤ 0 for all γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2]. The condition
23is necessary, because if t∗
0(γ) were strictly positive for some γ, then a type γ′ ≥ γ∗
2 would have
a strict incentive to announce type γ and then, without acquiring information, simply cash
in the quitting–price t∗
0(γ) > 0. This behavior would make the cost type γ′ strictly better
oﬀ than reporting his type truthfully, in which case he would receive a transfer of zero. The
second necessary condition is that the exercise–price must not be higher than the price under
the ﬁxed–price contract, that is, ¯ t∗ ≥ t∗
1(γ) for all γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2]. The condition is necessary,
because if ¯ t∗ were smaller than t∗
1(γ) for some γ, then a relatively eﬃcient type γ′ < γ∗
1 would
have a strict incentive to report type γ rather than his true type γ′ and then, without acquiring
information, choose the option to implement the project. This behavior would allow him to
complete the project for the transfer t∗
1(γ) instead of the lower transfer ¯ t∗.
We now argue that these two conditions are not only necessary but also suﬃcient for the
contract C′ to satisfy the constraints (12). To show suﬃciency, it remains to be checked that
an agent type, γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2], who is supposed to acquire information actually does so. There
are two deviations to consider. First, suppose that this agent type picks an option contract
but deviates by quitting the project without acquiring information. The deviation yields a
non–positive transfer t0(γ) and rejecting the contract would be a weakly better deviation. But
since C′ is individual rational, rejecting the contract cannot be proﬁtable. Second, suppose
that an agent type γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2] picks an option contract but deviates by completing the project
without acquiring information. If this deviation is proﬁtable, then, due to ¯ t∗ ≥ t∗
1(γ), an even
more proﬁtable deviation is to pick the ﬁxed–price contract. But because contract C′ satisﬁes
the adverse selection constraints (11), this second deviation is also not proﬁtable. Thus, we
have established:








0(γ) ≤ 0. (35)
In other words, the optimal contract with contractible information acquisition is also incentive–
compatible without contractible information acquisition if and only if option contracts display
quitting–penalties as well as exercise–prices that are lower than the price of the ﬁxed–price con-
tract. The combination of “low” exercise–prices and quitting–penalties achieves two objectives.
First, it motivates agent types with large cost uncertainties to acquire additional information.
24Second, it deters other agent types to simply cash in the compensation for information acqui-
sition costs without any information acquisition.
The crucial question now is whether the contract C∗ satisﬁes the condition (35). In general,
the answer depends on properties of the distribution G(c | γ). We now show that in the
independent case, C∗ meets (35).
Proposition 4 In the independent case, the contract C∗ satisﬁes (35), and thus solves problem
P.
We mention, without proof, that the proposition holds under weaker assumptions than
the independence assumption. Yet, there are alternative distributions for which the optimal
contract with contractible information acquisition violates (35). In these cases, a rigorous
analysis is complicated, because of the possibility of bunching.
7 Distortions
7.1 Information acquisition
In this section, we investigate the distortions in information acquisition. Recall that from an
eﬃciency perspective, it is worthwhile to acquire information when the expected beneﬁts from
reducing implementation errors exceed the costs of information acquisition. The perspective of
the principal is diﬀerent. Instead of the overall surplus, she is only interested in the share of the
surplus that she can extract. Due to asymmetric information, the principal must leave a part
of the surplus — the information rents — to the agent, and consequently she is also interested
in how information acquisition aﬀects these rents. In this section we identify an information
rent eﬀect, which distorts the principal’s incentives for inducing information acquisition.
Recall that the role of information acquisition depends on the default decision whether or
not to execute the project in the absence of additional information. In particular, information
acquisition is used to prevent type I errors (false positives), when the default decision is to
execute the project. In contrast, it is used to prevent type II errors (false negatives), when
the default option is to cancel the project. We now show that the distortions in information
acquisition are directly linked to the type of errors that information acquisition prevents.
25First, suppose that information acquisition is used to prevent type I errors. In this case,
the social value of information acquisition is JFB
I (γ) while the value to the principal is J∗
I(γ).










(c − v − ψ(γ,c)h(γ))dG(c | γ) ≤
  ∞
c0(γ)




The inequality shows that the principal overvalues information acquisition relative to the ﬁrst
best. That is, for preventing type I errors there is a positive information rent eﬀect which
increases the principal’s value above the ﬁrst best value of information.
The intuition behind why the information rent eﬀect is positive is as follows. When addi-
tional information prevents type I errors, some projects are turned down that would otherwise
have been implemented. This means that, from an ex ante perspective, information acquisition
reduces the implementation probability q (from one to something strictly smaller than one).
A reduction in q for some cost type implies that, from a period 1 perspective, it becomes less
worthwhile for a more eﬃcient cost type to mimic this cost type. Hence, the principal has to
pay lower information rents to the more eﬃcient cost types when inducing information acqui-
sition. This explains why the information rent eﬀect of preventing type I errors is positive. As






Next, suppose information acquisition is used to prevent type II errors. In this case, the
social value of information acquisition is JFB
II (γ) and the value to the principal is J∗
II(γ). Due










(v − c + ψ(γ,c)h(γ))dG(c | γ) ≥
  c0(γ)
−∞




26The inequality shows that the principal undervalues information acquisition relative to the ﬁrst
best. That is, for preventing type II errors there is a negative information rent eﬀect which
decreases the principal’s value below the ﬁrst best value of information.
Although the sign of the information rent eﬀect is now negative, the intuition behind the
result follows the same logic as the one we presented for type I errors. When additional
information prevents type II errors, some projects are implemented that would otherwise have
been canceled. This means that, from an ex ante perspective, information acquisition increases
the implementation probability q (from zero to something strictly larger than zero). An increase
in q for some cost type implies that, from a period 1 perspective, it becomes more worthwhile for
a more eﬃcient type to mimic this cost type. Hence, the principal has to pay higher information
rents to the more eﬃcient cost types when inducing information acquisition. This explains why
the information rent eﬀect of preventing type II errors is negative. As a result, the optimal






In sum, (39) and (43) imply that the set of types who acquire information in the second–
best, [γ∗
1,γ∗
2], lies to the left of the set of types who acquire information in the ﬁrst–best,
[γFB
1 ,γFB




2 ] acquire too much
information, and relatively ineﬃcient types [γFB
1 ,γFB
2 ] \ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2] acquire too little information.
In this sense, the level of information acquisition under the optimal contract is distorted upwards
for relatively eﬃcient types and downwards for relatively ineﬃcient types. Standard screening
models typically display only downward distortions. As explained above, in our setup the
reason for distorting information acquisition diﬀerently for diﬀerent types lies in the diﬀerent
eﬀects that the prevention of type I and type II errors has on information rents.
7.2 Maximum value of information
We next address distortions in the maximum value of information. Proposition 3 shows that,
from a social welfare perspective, information acquisition is most valuable for an agent type
γ = v, where the uncertainty about whether the project yields a positive or negative value is










(v − c)dG(c | v). (44)
Lemma 5 demonstrates that, from the principal’s point of view, information acquisition is
most valuable for an agent of the type γ0. Consequently, the maximum value of information










(v − c + ψ(γ0,c)h(γ0))dG(c | γ0). (45)
A direct comparison of (44) and (45) reveals that the values diﬀer due to three eﬀects. First, in
the ﬁrst best the project is executed when c ≤ v, whereas the project is executed in the second
best only for c ≤ c0(γ0). This implies that, in the second best, the project is executed for
a smaller range of cost realizations. Second, the value of information acquisition itself diﬀers
by the information rent h(γ0). Just as the ﬁrst eﬀect, this second eﬀect causes the value of
information to be lower in the second best. Third, in the ﬁrst best the value of information is
maximal for the agent type v, whereas in the second best it is maximal for the more eﬃcient
agent type γ0. Because G( |v) stochastically dominates G( |γ0), this last eﬀect increases the
maximum value of information in the second best and thus countervails the ﬁrst two eﬀects.
Therefore, the overall eﬀect on the maximum value of information is ambiguous and depends
on the relative strengths of the three diﬀerent eﬀects.
Although we cannot say in general whether the maximum value of information acquisition
is larger in the ﬁrst or the second best, we obtain unambiguous results in the independent case.




FB(γ + h(γ)). (46)
Hence, the principal’s value of information from a type γ matches the social value of information
of the agent type γ′ = γ + h(γ). The relationship implies that the maximum value k∗ in the
second best coincides with the maximum value in the ﬁrst best kFB. Moreover, the principal’s
and the social value of information are the same for the most eﬃcient type γ = 0. Because the
hazard rate h(γ) is increasing, the relationship (46) implies that the curve JFB is a stretched


















Figure 2: Distortions in information acquisition in the independent case
version of the curve J∗ which starts in the same point γ = 0. In general, however, relationship
(46) does not hold and the maximum values k∗ and kFB may diﬀer in either way. Nevertheless,
the case of independence illustrates that any diﬀerences in the maximum value of information
must be due to correlation between the ﬁrst signal ˜ γ and the cost shock ˜ s.
Figure 2 illustrates the distortions graphically for the independent case. The curve J∗
I lies
higher than the curve JFB
I , whereas the curve J∗
II lies below the curve JFB
II . This implies that
for a given k, the set of types who acquire information the second–best, [γ∗
1,γ∗
2] lies to the left
of the set of types who acquire information in the ﬁrst–best, [γFB
1 ,γFB
2 ]. It further shows how




2 ] are disjoint; none of the
types who acquire information in the second best acquire information in the ﬁrst best. This
demonstrates that distortions may lead to qualitative diﬀerent outcomes.
8 Conclusions
We study how a principal optimally deals with the incentive problems in project manage-
ment when, due to large cost uncertainties, procurement projects require pre–project planning.
These incentive problems typically involve both hidden information and hidden action. A gen-
eral conclusion that emerges from our analysis is that, despite the diverse incentive problems,
the principal generally beneﬁts from inducing the agent to conduct pre–project investigations.
In line with the applied literature on project management, the principal should however not
29relinquish too much control to the agent. In particular, she should not allow the agent to
ﬁrst acquire information and then decide about accepting the contract. This is harmful to the
principal, because it enables the agent to abuse the pre–project planning phase to enhance
his informational advantage. Instead, we demonstrate that the principal can provide optimal
incentives through a menu of option contracts from which the agent can select before acquiring
additional information. These option contracts give the agent a costly quitting option and,
thereby, achieve the dual goal of providing incentives for information acquisition as well as
truthful revelation.
We show that the hidden information problem leads to systematic distortions in information
acquisition. In a ﬁrst best world without incentive problems, the acquired information from pre–
project investigations is either used to mitigate cost overruns (type I errors) or to prevent false
negatives (type II errors). In a second best world, where the agent has private cost information
(ex ante hidden information), the principal has to pay the agent information rents. The way
in which information acquisition aﬀects these rents depends on the exact use of information
acquisition: When information acquisition prevents type I errors, it reduces information rents.
When information acquisition prevents type II errors, it increases information rents. This
leads to the distortion that, in comparison to the ﬁrst best, the principal induces the agent
to acquire too much information to prevent type I errors and too little information to prevent
type II errors.
The hidden action problem may lead to additional distortions beyond those created by the
hidden information problem alone. We show, however, that this is not the case, when the
agent’s initial cost estimate is independent of his forecasting error. In this sense, the hidden
information problem is more severe than the hidden action problem. The formal analysis of
the case in which the initial cost estimate is correlated with the forecasting error, becomes
considerably more involved and requires a more stylized model to remain tractable.
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Proof of Lemma 2 Let




I(ˆ γ,c) dG(c | γ) + (1 − α(ˆ γ))[¯ t(ˆ γ) − γ¯ q(ˆ γ)] (47)
be the agent type γ’s utility when he reports ˆ γ in period 1. Note that U(γ) = ˜ U(γ;γ). We ﬁrst
show that the derivative of U equals the partial derivative of ˜ U with respect to γ.
To see this, note ﬁrst that since ∂g/∂γ exists and is bounded, ∂ ˜ U/∂γ exists. Now, let
γ > ˆ γ. By, incentive compatibility (11), the type γ has no incentive to report ˆ γ. Thus:
U(γ) − U(ˆ γ) ≥ ˜ U(ˆ γ;γ) − ˜ U(ˆ γ;ˆ γ). Likewise, the type ˆ γ has no incentive to report γ. Thus:
U(γ) − U(ˆ γ) ≤ ˜ U(γ;γ) − ˜ U(γ; ˆ γ). Hence,
˜ U(ˆ γ;γ) − ˜ U(ˆ γ; ˆ γ)
γ − ˆ γ
≤
U(γ) − U(ˆ γ)
γ − ˆ γ
≤
˜ U(γ;γ) − ˜ U(γ;ˆ γ)
γ − ˆ γ
. (48)
As ˆ γ goes to γ, the right and the left term converge to ∂ ˜ U(γ;γ)/∂γ. Consequently, the left limit
of the middle term exists and equals ∂ ˜ U(γ;γ)/∂γ. An analogous argument implies that also
the right limit exists and equals ∂ ˜ U(γ;γ)/∂γ, too. Thus, we obtain that U′(γ) = ∂ ˜ U(γ;γ)/∂γ.
We conclude the proof by computing ∂ ˜ U/∂γ. We have









dc − (1 − α(ˆ γ))¯ q(ˆ γ). (49)

















Now note that limc→−∞G(c | γ) = 0 for all γ so that limc→−∞∂G(c | γ)/∂γ = 0. Similarly,
limc→+∞ ∂G(c | γ)/∂γ = 0. Thus, the ﬁrst term in the previous expression vanishes, and we
arrive at








dc − (1 − α(ˆ γ))¯ q(ˆ γ). (51)
When we now evaluate this at ˆ γ = γ, we obtain the expression stated in Lemma 2, and this
completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Derivation of the objective in (22) Integration by parts delivers
  ¯ γ
0
U(γ) dF(γ) = U(γ)F(γ)|
¯ γ
0 −












31where we have used that U(γ)F(γ)|
¯ γ
0 = U(¯ γ) = 0. Inserting this in the objective (15) yields
that
W =





[v − c]q(γ,c) dG(c | γ) − k] + (1 − α(γ))[v − γ]¯ q(γ) + U
′(γ)h(γ) dF(γ).(54)
If we now use the expression for U′ stated in Lemma 2, we obtain the objective in (22). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4 By assumption, ψ is non–increasing in c. Therefore c − ψ(γ,c) is strictly
increasing in c so that there is a unique solution c0(γ) to v−c+ψ(γ,c) = 0, and v−c+ψ(γ,c) > 0
if and only if c < c0(γ). Evidently, we have that c0(γ) ≤ v. Similarly, since h(γ) is non–
decreasing by assumption, there is a unique solution γ0 to v−γ−h(γ) = 0, and v−γ−h(γ) > 0
if and only if γ < γ0. Clearly, γ0 ≤ v. In light of the objective (22), this implies that q∗ and ¯ q∗
are optimal. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 We have already argued in the main text that q∗ satisﬁes (19). Next,
we deﬁne transfers (¯ t∗,t∗) and then compute the utilities induced by (α∗,¯ t∗, ¯ q∗,t∗,q∗) and verify
(11).
The construction of transfers is guided by the necessary conditions that incentive compati-
bility and individual rationality impose on the agent’s utility, given (α∗,q∗).
(i) For γ > γ∗
2, α∗ = q∗ = 0, and so individual rationality implies that ¯ t∗(γ) = 0.
(ii) For γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2], the project is implemented if and only if c < c0(γ). Thus, period 2
incentive compatibility implies that t∗(γ,c) is equal to some ﬁxed, c–independent transfer t∗
1(γ)
if c < c0(γ) and to some ﬁxed, c–independent transfer t∗
0(γ) if c ≥ c0(γ). Moreover, the critical





0(γ) + c0(γ). (55)











G(c | γ) dc − k, (56)
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Now, individual rationality implies
that U(γ∗













2) − c)G(c | γ
∗
2) dc. (57)
32Moreover, (21) implies that U′(γ) =
  c0(γ)
−∞ ∂G/∂γ dc. In light of (56), the derivative of t∗
0,
therefore has to satisfy t∗′
0 (γ) = −c′













0(z)G(c0(z) | z) dz. (58)
(iii) For γ < γ∗
1, since α∗ = q∗ = 1, incentive compatibility implies that ¯ t∗(γ) has to be
equal to some ﬁxed, γ–independent ¯ t∗. Moreover, incentive compatibility also implies that the
agent’s utility is continuous at γ∗
1, so that we have ¯ t∗ − limγ↑γ∗
1 γ = U(γ∗
1). Hence,
¯ t













1) − c) dG(c | γ
∗
1). (59)
We can now verify that (α∗,¯ t∗, ¯ q∗,t∗,q∗) satisﬁes (11). Let ˜ U(ˆ γ;γ) be deﬁned as in (47). To
simplify notation, we omit the asterices in the following derivations. We have to show that
∆ ≡ U(γ) − ˜ U(ˆ γ;γ) ≥ 0 ∀γ, ˆ γ. (60)
Indeed, the fact that U(ˆ γ) = ˜ U(ˆ γ;ˆ γ) implies







∂ ˜ U(ˆ γ,z)
∂γ
dz. (61)
Now, expression (51) for ∂ ˜ U/∂γ is generally true for all transfers. Further, U′ takes on the













[(1 − α(z))¯ q(z) − (1 − α(ˆ γ))¯ q(ˆ γ)] dz. (63)
A suﬃcient condition for this to be non–negative is that
(a) α(γ)q(γ,c) is non–increasing in γ for all c, and
(b) (1 − α(γ))¯ q(γ) is non–increasing in γ.
To see this, let ˆ γ < γ. Then (b) implies that the integrand in the integral in the second
line is non–positive for all z ∈ [ˆ γ,γ] and thus, the second line is non–negative. As for the ﬁrst
line, recall that ﬁrst order stochastic dominance ranking of {G(  | γ)}γ implies ∂G/∂γ ≤ 0.
This together with (a) implies that the integral
  +∞
−∞ [α(z)q(z,c) − α(ˆ γ)q(ˆ γ,c)]∂G(c | z)/∂γ dc
is non–negative for all z ∈ [ˆ γ,γ]. Thus, also the ﬁrst line is non–negative. For ˆ γ > γ, the
argument is analogous.
33To complete the proof, observe that (α∗, ¯ q∗,q∗) satisﬁes (a) and (b). Hence, we have estab-
lished that ∆ ≥ 0, and this completes the proof. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4 Note that because ψ = −1 in the independent case, the deﬁnition (27)
of c0 implies that c0(γ) = v−h(γ). We now show that t∗
0(γ∗
2) = 0. Indeed, with c0(γ) = v−h(γ),














which is zero by the deﬁnition of γ∗
2. Further, notice that c0 is decreasing in γ by deﬁnition
(27) so that c′
0 ≤ 0. Thus, (58) implies that t∗
0(γ) ≤ 0 for all γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2].
To see that ¯ t∗ ≥ t∗
1(γ) for all γ ∈ [γ∗
1,γ∗
2], observe that t∗
1 is decreasing in γ, because (58)
and (55) imply that
t
∗′
1 (γ) = −c
′
0(γ)G(c0(γ) | γ) + c
′
0(γ), (65)
which is non–positive since c′
0 ≤ 0. Thus, it suﬃces to show that ¯ t∗ − t∗
1(γ∗
1) ≥ 0. Indeed, by

























1)) dG(c | γ
∗
1), (67)




1). Now note that c − c0(γ∗
1) = c + h(γ∗
1) − v, and
therefore (67) is zero by the deﬁnition of γ∗
1. And this is what we wanted to show. Q.E.D.
Derivation of (46) Consider ﬁrst the case γ > γ0. In the independent case, (2) implies
J∗(γ) =
  c0(γ)
−∞ [v −c −h(γ)]ˆ g(c −γ)dc. Consider the change of variable a(c) = c+ h(γ). Recall





[v − a]ˆ g(a − γ − h(γ))da =
  v
−∞
[v − a]g(a | γ + h(γ))da = J
FB(γ + h(γ)). (68)
The argument for the case γ ≤ γ0 is identical. Q.E.D.
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